OGMATIC theology treats many truths of momentous import, but there is not one of more fundamental importance than the question of the ultimate purpose or end of creation. For if the end holds the primacy among all causes and if, from it, all other causes depend for the exercise of their causality, 1 then there can be no theological doctrine dealing with the relations of creatures to God, whose objective truth is not dependent ultimately on the first of all causes, which is the ultimate end of creation. This truth is not merely basic in dogmatic theology but also constitutes the necessary foundation of Christian morality and of all asceticism that is not chimerical.
ultimus of creation is God Himself and the finis-cui is defined as the subject or person for whom the finis-qui is intended; in addition most modern authors define finis-quo but do not apply it to the last end of creation; simultaneously with the above explanation and application of terminology, the same authors maintain that no created goodness could have been a motive determining God's creative act and, consequently, that God's intrinsic perfection is in no way changed by creation and is in no way intrinsically affected by His extrinsic glory. 8 Now this method of explaining the Catholic doctrine on the last end of creation has been criticized severely by two outstanding theologians of the present generation. In the opinion of the first, the Reverend Johann Stuffier, S.J., the affirmation of so many modern theologians that the absolutely ultimate end of creation, the finis-qui operis, is not God Himself, but rather a created good, namely, His extrinsic glory, is entirely untenable. The same author furthermore states that only by a noteworthy lack of logic can modern authors of manuals place the finis-qui operis in a finite entity such as extrinsic glory, since they admit in agreement with Saint Thomas that the Divine goodness is the sole ratio creandi and that God can only intend created things (and consequently His extrinsic glory which is finite) inasmuch as they are images of His infinite goodness. 4 Cardinal Billot was equally severe in his strictures of the terminology and method of exposition which would place the finis-qui in extrinsic glory. Of this method he states: "Indeed this first way (of understanding the problem) cannot even be considered. For thus the glory which is derived from creatures would be a means of God's enrichment; it would be God's purpose precisely as it is the purpose of worldly men who place their highest good in extrinsic glory and of whom it is truly said that if, perchance, they receive the re-cation is, of course, openly inconsistent with the affirmation of all theologians that the finis operantis cannot possibly be finite or in any way really distinct from God. 8 For it is clear that the absolutely last end of creatures, whose existence, nature and every action are principally due to the efficient activity of God, the First Cause of all things, must be identical with His finis operantis, that is, His infinite goodness, which consequently must be considered to be the sole sufficient reason of the creative act and at the same time the unique ultimate end or first final cause of everything finite, including of course the operations of creatures, in which extrinsic glory consists principally. Nor is the difficulty with this terminology solved as simply as some would imply, by insisting that, although something finite is the ultimate finis-qui of creatures (and, by logical implication, of the creative act itself), nevertheless God Himself is the ultimate finis-cui for Whom extrinsic glory is intended; for no entity whatsoever is a true finis except inasmuch as its own intrinsic goodness exercises final causality. Hence, since the absolutely last finis-qui is placed in something finite and since nothing finite can in any way affect God's intrinsic goodness, then, if God be the last end of creation only inasmuch as He is the finis-cui, that is, the subject for whom extrinsic glory is intended, it is very difficult to see how God is in any way intrinsically and really the last end and first cause of all things. Now there can be no doubt that all Catholic theologians, no matter what terminology or method of exposition they follow, must and do hold that God Himself, in His own intrinsic and infinite goodness, is, by no means metaphorically, but, in a most real and true sense, the absolutely last end and the first final cause of all finite being. For this truth is too clearly contained in revelation to admit of denial. 7 On the other hand, it would be open heresy to deny that the world was created for the glory of God, 8 which all theologians understand as extrinsic glory, namely the finite manifestation of God's intrinsic perfection and the finite communication of His intrinsic goodness.
It is however equally clear that extrinsic glory, as a finite entity, cannot be the absolutely last end of creatures, since it is itself a creature, and hence is caused ultimately by God whose intrinsic goodness is the final cause of all things. Consequently, though the terminology used so commonly seems inadequate to explain the fulness of Catholic doctrine, this by no means implies that the authors who make use if it are guilty of theological error, though they may, it seems, be rightly charged with logical inconsistency. This inconsistency, as already noted, seems due in large part, to a literal following of Lessius and a corresponding neglect of Saint Thomas. Now it is a rather startling fact that Lessius, in his entire treatment of the last end of creation, never cites or follows either Saint Thomas or Suarez, both of whom treated the question fully and with precisely the same terminology, which leaves no room for ambiguity and embraces adequately all the data of revelation and sound philosophy.
Consequently, the scope of this article is to propose systematically the doctrine and terminology of Saint Thomas and to indicate briefly Suarez* complete conformity. This mere exposition, with short comments will suffice, it is hoped, to show how much modern theologians have lost in clarity and effectiveness, by practically deserting these two recognized masters for the more subjective and anthropomorphic presentation of Lessius. In other articles, it may be possible to show in greater detail the logical inconsistency of the treatment based on Lessius and the conformity of Saint Thomas and Suarez with the doctrine proposed in the Councils of Cologne and the Vatican.
FINIS GPERIS ET OPERANTIS OF CREATION
According to Saint Thomas, the finis operantis is that which an agent principally intends.
9 Then in the same place, applying this definition to God's creative activity, he continues: "Whence-also in the case of God operating, the end of His action must be considered, which is the goodness of God in Himself" 1 * The perfect agreement of this definition and application of Saint Thomas with the definition and application of the Council of Cologne, whose dogmatic value is very high because of the unrestricted approbation of the Holy See, 11 is evident from a cursory reading of the latter: "If the finis operantisj or that which impelled God to create, be sought, it should be stated that nothing which is distinct from God could have impelled Him, since, being self -sufficient, He could intend nothing for Himself. Since, however, it is clear that God did create and that, whatever He effects, He does it out of love of His absolute goodness, we rightly maintain that God was moved by His goodness freely to create the world. Moreover, in this same sense Saint Augustine said: 'Because He is good, we exist'." 12 Saint Thomas never deviated from this definition of finis operantis, but rather, in his later works develops more completely the notion of voliti principalis. "The principal object desired is for everyone the cause of volition. For, when we say: *I wish to walk for health's sake', we are conscious of assigning a cause, and if it be asked: 'Why do you wish for health?' we proceed in the designation of causes until we reach the ultimate purpose which is the object principally intended, which in itself is the cause of volition. erantis. This identity is made even clearer by the following citation: "Furthermore, for every person making an act of volition, the object principally intended is his last end; for the end is per se intended and that on account of which all other things are intended. The ultimate end, however, is God Himself, because He is the highest good. He therefore is the principal object of His will." 14 From this citation, it is clear that God Himself intrinsically, and not something finite and totally extrinsic to Him, is at one and the same time the finis operantis and the ultimate end of all things finite which are intended by Him in the creative act. Certainly, no one could maintain that in this text Saint Thomas teaches that the last end of creatures is indeed some Divine good, but a good that is not intrinsic to and identified with the Divinity-a doctrine not uncommonly proposed in theological and philosophical manuals.
15
If therefore the intrinsic goodness of God is the unique principale volitum, it follows that absolutely nothing outside of God can possibly be His finis operantis. This is a truth which Saint Thomas proves many times from a further analysis of the volitum principale. "The object of an appetite is proportioned to the appetite as the object moving is proportioned to th& subject that is moved; and likewise is the object willed proportioned to the will, since the will belongs to the genus of appetitive potencies. If therefore there be any other principal object of the Divine will than the very goodness of God, it will follow that there is something superior to the Divine will which moves it."
16
The absolute and supreme unicity of God's finis operantis in no way conflicts logically with the concept of creation, as if God could not intend beings outside of Himself unless they were in some way His finis operantis, for this is a false and ^demonstrable concept of creation; but it does imply, on the contrary, that the finis operantis is the entire and sole sufficient reason for that intention of the Divine will which terminates in finite being. "It must be stated that in those things which we will on account of an end, the entire reason for so willing is the end. And this is supremely clear in those things which we will solely on account of the end. Hence, since God does not will things other than Himself except on account of the end which is His goodness, it does not follow that something other than His goodness moves His will. ... It must be said that from the fact that Divine goodness is sufficient unto the Divine will, it does not follow that God wills nothing else, but that He wills nothing else except by reason of His goodness."
17
It is scarcely necessary to add that the volitum principal, which according to Saint Thomas, moves God to will creatures and is the sole reason why He intends finite beings, is not to be understood as a strict cause, but rather as the unique sufficient reason of the creative will and only mentally distinct from it. "Whence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another, but by Itself alone; after that fashion by which intellection and volition are called motion; and accordingly Plato said that the Prime Mover moves Himself."
18
Thus far we have seen that St. Thomas maintains that the intrinsic and, therefore, infinite goodness of God is the unique finis operantis of the creative act. We are now in a position to show more intimately and precisely what he understood by the intrinsic goodness of God and how it is identified with the absolutely ultimate finis operis. "The communication of entity and goodness proceeds from goodness; a fact which is clear both from the very nature of goodness and from its intelligibility. For according to its nature, every being's good is its act [existence] and perfection. Moreover every being acts precisely because it exists. By acting, it diffuses being and goodness into other beings. The intelligibility of goodness is con-stituted by its appetibility, which is the end, which, moreover, moves the agent to act. Wherefore goodness is said to be diffusive of itself. But this diffusion is found in God; therefore God is truly good."
19
Hence the intrinsic goodness of God moves His will to create, precisely inasmuch as it is diffusivum sui and therefore it is not only God's unique finis operantis, but is also the unique ultimate end and first cause of all creatures, since according to St. Thomas: "It must be said that goodness is called diffusive of itself in the precise way in which the finis is said to move and thus the axiom: 'because God is good, we exist* is to be referred to the final cause." 20 The objection maintained that the axiom referred to the efficient cause.
Are we, however, to understand the intrinsic goodness of God, which is simultaneously and uniquely the finis operantis and supreme last end of creation, as the ontological, i.e., essential goodness of God or His moral goodness i.e. the virtue of beneficence? Saint Thomas replies unequivocally that we should understand it as the essential goodness of God: "Every good which is not its own goodness is said to be good only by participation; but that which is predicated by participation presupposes an anterior being from which it receives its goodness. But this process cannot be infinite, because there is no infinite process in final causes. . . . We must therefore arrive at some first good which is not merely good by participation in subordination to something else, but which is, by its very essence, good. This being, however, is God." or absolutely ultimate purpose of all things, principally intended by God in creating, is His extrinsic glory, which, so evidently, is a good only in virtue of its participation in the Divine goodness itself.
How then does God's goodness, as the sole sufficient reason or finis operantis of creation, move the Divine will? Saint Thomas replies that the creative will is moved by God's goodness as it is apprehended intellectually by Him: "The will is moved to act by some apprehension (cognition); for, good apprehended is the object of the will. Hence every agent must act accordingly as it possesses a similitude of its effect. But in every voluntary agent as such, there exists a similitude of the effect according to the apprehension of the intellect."
23
This Divine apprehension, therefore, inasmuch as it is identified with God's essential perfection, is the Divine goodness apprehended: inasmuch as it is a similtude of every creature, actual or possible, it is called an idea. Whence is this idea derived? Saint Thomas replies: "Whoever knows an object perfectly, knows everything that is in it. But God knows Himself perfectly. Therefore, He knows all things which are in Himself according to His active potency. But all things according to their proper forms are in Him with respect to His active potency, since He is the first principle of all being. Therefore He has a proper knowledge of all things. Whoever knows any nature, knows whether that nature is communicable. But the Divine nature is communicable through similitude. God therefore knows in how many ways something similar to His essence can exist. God therefore has knowledge of things according to their proper forms." 28 Inasmuch, however, as "God, in His essence, is the similitude of all things, whence an idea in God is nothing else but His essence", 24 it follows that we must not attribute to God ideas entitatively distinct from each other. Nevertheless we are jus-22 Contra Gent. 2, 24, 1.
Contra Gent, 1, JO, 7-8. 2i Summa Theol I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2. tified in predicating a certain multiplicity of ideas in God with respect to creatures. Furthermore, the fundament of such a predication is not derived from creatures; for according to Saint Thomas: "It must be said that these varying respects, according to which Divine ideas are multiplied, are not caused by finite beings, but by the Divine intellect comparing its own essence with them (creatures) ." 25 Furthermore, "these respects which multiply ideas are not in created things, but are in God; they are not, however, real relations such as those by which the persons are distinguished, but they are relations comprehended by God."
26

From this doctrine on Divine ideas Saint Thomas proves that
God, that is, the ideas themselves which are identified with His essence, is the exemplary cause of all finite beings: "There must be in the Divine wisdom species of all things, that is, exemplary forms existing in the Divine mind. And these, though multiplied with respect to created beings, are nevertheless not really distinct from the Divine essence, inasmuch as its similitude can be variously participated by finite beings. Thus, therefore, God Himself is the first exemplar of all things."
27
In answering the difficulty that, since every effect of an exemplary cause must be a similitude of its exemplar and since no creature can bear a similitude to God, therefore God cannot be an exemplary cause, Saint Thomas replies: "It must be stated that although creatures do not arrive at a similitude with God according to His nature by a specific similitude, nevertheless they do attain to His similitude according to the representation of the form apprehended by God." 28 But, as we have seen, this form apprehended by God is in no wise derived from creatures; rather it is identified with His intrinsic goodness as known by the Divine intellect; it is therefore really identified with God's finis operantis and with the absolutely last end of all creatures.
In addition, Saint Thomas gives a penetrating and exhaustive analysis of what is required that the Divine ideas, to which each creature is perfectly assimilated by way of finite representation, be truly an exemplary cause: "It is to be noted that something may imitate a form in two ways. First by the intention of the efficient cause, as a picture is produced by a painter precisely that it may imitate him whose figure is reproduced; sometimes, however, the imitation is accidental, fortuitous and quite removed from any intention. But that which imitates a form by chance cannot be said to be formed unto it, for unto implies finality. We see moreover that one may act on account of an end in two ways; in the first way, so that the efficient cause determines the end for himself-sometimes, however, the end is determined for the agent by another principal efficient cause as in the motion of an arrow.... If, therefore, something be produced in imitation of another by an agent which does not determine its own end, the form imitated will not possess the attribute of an exemplar or an idea. For we do not say that the form of a man who generates is the exemplar or idea of the man generated, but we say this only when the agent acting on account of an end determines the end, whether the form in question be within or without the agent. This, therefore, is the proper notion of an idea that it be a form which something imitates because of the intention of an agent who determines for himself the end. Accordingly, it is clear that in the opinion of those who assume that all beings proceed from God by a natural necessity, Divine ideas cannot be postulated, because beings which act from a necessity of nature do not determine for themselves the end. But this cannot be, for in the case of every being which acts for a purpose, if it does not determine the end for itself, then the end must be determined by some superior being; and thus there is some cause superior to the agent; which cannot be, because all who speak of God, understand Him to be the first cause of all being.... But, because an exemplary form or idea possesses in a certain way the attribute of finis and because from it the artificer receives the form by which he acts, if it be extrinsic to him; because moreover it is not proper to postulate that God acts on account of an end other than Himself and thus receives extraneously what is required for acting, therefore, we cannot place ideas outside of God, but in the Divine mind alone." 29 Therefore, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas on exemplary cause, every creature arrives, by way of finite participation, at a perfect imitation or representation of the Divine ideas. These Divine ideas are identified with the goodness of God intellectually apprehended by Him as communicable in varying degrees by finite communication. The goodness of God thus apprehended is, at one and the same time, God's finis operands and the first final cause or absolutely last end of all creatures. We conclude with Saint Thomas, therefore, that the finis operantis is absolutely unique, namely, the intrinsic goodness of God inasmuch as it is communicable, even if God had freely chosen never to create; it is the principal object intended by the Divine will in creation, because of which alone God freely intends those beings which He actually creates, and hence it alone is the unique absolute and ultimate end and the first final cause of everything finite without exception: "It must be stated that all beings intend God as their end, in intending whatsoever good, whether by intellectual, sensible or natural appetite; for nothing has the attribute of the good, except in as much as it participates in the similitude of God." 30 The similitude, as we have seen, in the citation from the Summa, Part I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2um, is identified with the essence of God.
That the doctrine of Saint Thomas was held completely and identically by Suarez, is evident from the following citation: "For any agent, the supreme end is that which constitutes for him the best and highest good; but for the First Agent, nothing except His own intrinsic goodness, is the greatest and highest good; therefore nothing can be the last end of His actions and effects, except Himself, by reason of His own goodness. Fur-29 2>* Veritate, q. 3, a. 1. m Summa Theol. I, q. 44, a. 1, ad 3. thermore, because the concept of final cause is perfect and in itself pertains to unmixed perfection, therefore, it is proper to God in the highest degree of perfection and because, since goodness is the reason of final causality and God is the highest good, it is necessary that He possess in the highest degree the attribute and perfection of final cause. . . . Finally the axiom, that the order of ends is according to the order of efficient causes, is here pertinent. For the more perfect and universal the agent, the more perfect and universal is the end which he intends. But God is the most perfect and universal agent; therefore, He intends the most perfect and universal end. Therefore to the objection previously raised, 31 we answer that although God does not act on account of Himself, as on account of His own end [that is, final cause in a strict sense of causality, as opposed to sufficient reason], nevertheless, there can be but one supreme end of all things, not because God seeks that end for His own satiety or that in this end He may possess a sufficiency of all goods, but, on the contrary, because He already possesses in Himself all good and the highest perfection, by which alone He could be moved or attracted to benefit others because of Himself. Whence, though it be true that among the beings created by Him, God orders some unto others as ends, or rather, connects all in such a way that all in turn serve each other and in this way, under God, there can be assigned other universal ends to which each creature, apart from individual ends, is ordained by the Creator, and in particular, to the order and beauty of the universe [in which the highest degree of extrinsic glory is found], nevertheless, absolutely nothing apart from God can be called the last end toward which the Divine intention or action tends."
82
The superiority of Saint Thomas and of Suarez, in excluding from God's creative activity any semblance of acting to acquire and in excluding from creatures any semblance of being either the finis operantis or the absolutely ultimate finis operis, is clear 31 The objection was that the last end of all things is the order of the universe in which extrinsic glory, in the highest degree, consists. Saint Thomas says that God acts ad extra in order to communicate His goodness, he by no means implies that the finite communication is either the supreme finis operis or in any way the finis operantis, but he wishes solely to exclude from God any motive by which He might even seem to be creating, not to communicate, but to acquire some goodness not already His from all eternity. Always presupposed in the phrase ut communicet is the finis itself, that is, Bonitas Dei movet voluntatem ut communicet.
That this is Saint Thomas* mind is clear from the following passage; "Goodness in God implies the notion of finis, in which there is the fullest perfection; the end however moves the efficient cause to act; whence also the goodness of God, in a certain fashion, moves Him to operate, not indeed that He may acquire goodness, but that He may communicate His goodness to others. For, as has been said, God does not act out of desire for an end, but out of love for the end, when He wishes to communicate His goodness inasmuch as it is possible and proper in accord with His providence. And therefore, as the end in all operations is the first principle, so the Divine goodness is the first principle of the entire communication by which God lavishes His perfections on others." 38 From this passage, it is evident that the Divine intrinsic goodness is not only the finis operantis of God, as the efficient cause of all creatures, but that the same Divine goodness is the supreme finis operis or the first final cause of the entire finite communication of His goodness. It is true that there are other texts in which, because of their immediate scope and because he supposes the complete doctrine to be otherwise known, Saint Thomas does not assert that the Divine goodness is the finis operantis and supreme end of creatures but states simply that God acts because of His goodness to communicate it: "God produced all things unto being, not from a necessity of His nature but through His intellect and will. There can be no other 1 end of His intellect and will except His goodness, that He may communicate it to finite beings as is evident from the premises." tures, as the Angelic Doctor well says (De Pot. q. 3, a. 1 J, ad 14). Hence the formal reason on the part of creatures of terminating the love of God is not to be derived from any relation to passive communication, but from their immediate relation to the Divine goodness which is communicated; and it has been shown that this relation cannot be one of utility. Furthermore, such a passive manifestation and communication is not something outside creatures, but is included in them/' 41 From this passage we see again that the passive communication of the Divine goodness is neither the finis operantis nor the absolutely ultimate finis operis, because such a doctrine would imply that God created for some goodness to be acquired for Himself precisely through passive communication, which would, in this absurd hypothesis, have been the final cause of the creative will. Hence, such a doctrine logically would lead to the denial of God's transcendence, His infinite perfection, His very Divinity.
Having established one of the cardinal points of Saint Thomas' doctrine, let us now see how he further applies what we have thus far seen, from the precise way in which God is moved by His intrinsic goodness to the ordination of creatures unto their end: "The order of ends follow upon the order of efficient causes. For as the supreme efficient cause moves all secondary causes, so all the ends of secondary causes must be ordained to the end of the supreme efficient cause. But the supreme efficient cause produces the actions of all subordinate causes, moving them all to their proper actions and consequently to their ends. Whence it follows that all the ends of secondary causes are ordained by the first cause to His proper end. The first efficient cause of all things however is God. But there is no other end of His will except His goodness, which is Himself. All things therefore whatsoever, that are produced either immediately by Him or through secondary causes, are ordained unto God as their end." Hence according to Saint Thomas* definition of the finis opens, namely, that to which an effect is ordered by an efficient cause, it is clear from the passage just cited that God Himself, that is, His intrinsic goodness quae est ipsemet, and not some goodness totally extrinsic to Him is the supreme, unique finis operis of all things; not indeed in the sense that the Divine goodness is increased or perfected by creatures, but in the most perfect sense of finis, namely, that it is the one good from which all created good is derived.
The unicity of the supreme finis operis is brought out even more clearly by the following citation from the same passage: "From this, it is apparent that all things are ordered unto one good as their ultimate end. For if no being tends towards another as its end except inasmuch as the latter is good, it must therefore be that good, precisely inasmuch as it is good, is an end. Therefore that which is the highest good is par excellence the end of all things. But the highest good is one alone which is God; all things therefore are ordered, as unto their end, unto one good which is God."
43
Granted therefore the truth of this citation (and it would seem impossible to disprove it), whoever would place the supreme end of creation in something outside of God, if he possesses any correct notions of final causality, must logically either place the summum bonum in something created or adhere to some form of pantheism. Moreover from the same chapter just cited it is clear that the supreme finis operis is identical with the first final cause and that neither can be placed in anything finite: "The end holds the primacy among all causes and from the end all other causes derive the exercise of their causality. For the efficient cause does not act except on account of an end as has been shown. Moreover, by the efficient cause, matter is reduced into the act of the form; whence matter becomes actually the matter of this being, and similarly the form of this thing is derived by the action of the efficient cause and consequently from the end. In addition the posterior end is the 43 ibid. 1. cause why the preceding end is intended as an end; for a being is not moved unto a proximate end except because of the ultimate end. Therefore the ultimate end is the first of all causes. But to be the first of all causes is necessarily proper to the first being which is God. God therefore is the last end of all things."
44
Saint Thomas now moves on to inquire how God is the end of all things. First he proceeds negatively. The end in general can be first in causation, though it be last in existence. Such an end is called technically a finis constituendus or efficiendus (for example, extrinsic glory, which is an effect of God as primary, and of creatures, as secondary efficient causes). But God is in nowise such an end with regard to creatures. Saint Thomas concludes thus: "God therefore is in this way the end of creatures, namely, as something to be obtained by each creature in its own manner." For, "God is simultaneously the last end of creatures and the first efficient cause. But an end constituted by the action of an efficient cause cannot be the first efficient cause but is rather the effect of the efficient cause. God cannot therefore be the end of ceatures as something constituted by them, but only as something preexisting to be obtained-"
45
From this citation again, all those are refuted who claim that the supreme finis operis of creatures is anything produced by creatures, such as their operations or the effect of their finite operations. For any such finite entity is indeed a manifestation and communication of the Divine goodness but it is not something preexisting; it is rather something constituted by the concurrent action of the first cause and of secondary causes; it is neither the first cause nor the second cause, but is really distinct from both; consequently, if it be termed the absolutely ultimate finis operis of all things, then we must deny that God is the supreme preexisting end, even as He is the supreme preexisting cause of all things.
We must conclude therefore with Saint Thomas: "It remains therefore that God is the end of creatures, not as some- For if God were solely the last end of creatures, in the sense that He acquires for Himself (as the finis-cut) some extrinsic and finite goodness such as extrinsic glory, one of two alternatives follows: 1. If He is really transcendent Divinity, then in the above hypothesis He is only metaphorically the last end of all things, since His intrinsic goodness can in no wise be affected by anything finite and no being whatsoever is constituted as a true end except by reason of its own intrinsic goodness; 2. If such an acquisition of an extrinsic good could constitute God intrinsically (and not merely anthropomorphically) as a real end of finite beings, He would no longer be a transcendent and infinite God, for there would now be a new intrinsic perfection in Him, not previously existing, which would have its final cause, in the strict sense of cause, in something finite.
Having established the one absolutely ultimate and supreme finis operis of all creatures, namely, the intrinsic, communicable goodness of God to be acquired by each creature, we must now investigate in what this finite acquisition of the supreme end consists. If, as we have already seen 9 the goodness of God, though communicable even though He had never created, cannot be communicated actually by identity or even by a specific similitude, but only by an imitation or manifestation of those intentional and proper forms of the Divine intellect, which are, nevertheless, identified with God's essential and infinite goodness, it clearly follows that God ordains His creatures to the acquisition of His goodness by a finite communication which is altogether deficient and far removed from the infinite reality of the supreme end, which is none the less actually acquired. This deficient and limited communication, manifestation or imitation of the Divine goodness, which Saint Thomas designates with one word, namely, an assimilation to the Divine goodness, 4ft ibid. i. since it is, according to the degree freely determined by Divine providence, the ultimate intrinsic and finite perfection, by which each creature according to its nature obtains God the absolutely ultimate end, can be called and is truly the end of each creature and moreover the ultimate in the order of finite and created ends: "If every being tends toward a similitude of Divine goodness as an end; if a being is assimilated to the Divine goodness with regard to everything that pertains to its own goodness; if the goodness of a being consists not only in its existence, but in all things else required for its perfection as has been shown, then, it is manifest that creatures are ordained to God as their end, not only according to their substantial being, but also according to their accidental perfection and moreover according to their proper operation, which also pertains to the perfection of a being."
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It is true that Saint Thomas frequently calls this created assimilation the last end of creatures, but he must be understood as intending, not the absolutely last or supreme end, but rather the attainment or acquisition of the supreme end, for if he had intended to affirm that the supreme end consisted in a creature, he would have contradicted all the passages which we have seen in this section, and especially the place in his De Potentia, where he says that "the communication of goodness is not the last end, but the Divine goodness itself out of whose love it is that God wishes to communicate it" (q. 3, a. 15, ad 14, cf. above 67 flf.); for then the finis operantis and the supreme finis operis would not be identical; God's infinite goodness would not be the supreme final cause of all finite being; moreover St, Thomas would then have contradicted what we shall see immediately in the following section.
RELATION OF FINIS-QUI AND FINIS-QUO
Saint Thomas teaches clearly that the unique ultimate finisqui of all things is God Himself, whereas the ultimate finis-quo, namely, the finite attainment of the finis-qui, is neither unique 47 Contra Gent. 3, 20, ad finem. nor even specifically the same for all creatures: "Conclusion: although God is the ultimate end of all things, nevertheless, there is not for men and for other creatures which lack reason, the same last end as regards its attainment. It must be stated, as the Philosopher says, that there is a two-fold division of finis,  namely, cuius and quo, that is, the object itself in which goodness is found and the use or attainment of it, for example, if disputation we distinguished a two-fold end, the objective (finis-qui) and the formal (finis-quo), that God is not the ultimate formal, but rather, the ultimate objective end of creatures. And the reason is, because the formal end is not the absolutely ultimate end, since it is ordained unto the objective. Likewise, because, though God be the summum bonum, nevertheless, creatures do not attain this summum bonum except by some sort of participation; whence the attainment of the summum bonum is always something created. Whence, in passing is solved the objection put above, namely, how such a great variety of beings and natures can be ordained to the same last end. For the reason is that this same and identical last end is not the attainment itself, but the good attained. Different beings, however, though they have in common the same ultimate end, differ in the attainment of it, even as they have the same first principle, but differ in the mode or degree of their emanation from it." 50 Furthermore, Suarez asserts explicity that the extrinsic glory of God is not a finis-qui, but the finis-quo of creation, a position exactly contrary to that taken by the modern followers of Lessius: "Thus, therefore, in answer to the difficulty, we concede that the glory of God is something outside of Him; for universally, glory, taken in its propfer sense and likewise according to its primitive meaning, is a good that is extrinsic to him whose it is. Nevertheless, God can intend His glory as an end, because He does not intend it as a finis-qui but as a finis-quo, which not only is not repugnant but is necessary." 51 Therefore, according to both Suarez and Saint Thomas, the ultimate finis-quf 2 and the supreme finis operis are identified. Consequently, since, as we have seen, the supreme end of all creatures is absolutely identical and unique, not merely generically or even specifically, but numerically, and is God Himself in His intrinsic goodness on account of Whom alone created m Uetaph. Disp. 24, sect. 1. (Edit. Berton, Vol. 25, p. 894) 5l De Gratia, Lib. 8, cap. 1. (Edit. Berton, Vol. 9, p. 312) 52 Summa TheoU I, Ilae, q. 2, a. 7, corp. goods can be desired as proximate ends, since all their finite goodness has its source in Him as the first final cause, it is clear beyond any possibility of doubt that, on the part of each separate creature, the intrinsic and created participation of the Divine goodness (extrinsic glory), inasmuch as it is a finite entity and is specifically distinct in creatures of different species and is, moreover, numerically distinct in all individual creatures, whether of the same or different species, cannot be the summum bonum and hence cannot be the numerically identical last end of all creatures without exception. Therefore no one can claim harmony with Saint Thomas and Suarez, if he holds that the finis-qui ultimus, the absolutely last end of all creatures is not God Himself, but a good totally extrinsic to Him, namely, His extrinsic glory.
Saint Thomas renders his mind doubly clear on this very important point by insisting that the supreme end of creatures is not merely extrinsic to each individual creature, but is extrinsic to the entire universe of created beings: "Since the end corresponds to the beginning, it is impossible to be ignorant of the end of things, once their principle is known. Since therefore the principle of created beings is something extraneous to the entire universe, namely God, it is necessary that the finis of created beings be some extrinsic good. Whence that good which is the end of the entire universe must be distinct from the entire universe. (To the second) Something extrinsic can be an end, not merely as an effect produced, as for example, the end of a carpenter is not to build but the house itself, but also as an object possessed, obtained or even represented, as when we say that Hercules is the finis of the picture which is made to represent him. Thus, therefore, it can be said that a good, extraneous to the entire universe, as a good to be obtained or represented, is the finis of the governing of creatures. (To the third) Indeed, there is an end of the universe existing in it, namely, the order of the universe. But this is not the last end, but is ordered unto an extrinsic good as the ultimate end." Furthermore, Saint Thomas frequently states that the order of the universe is a more primary intention of God than the individual perfections of single creatures: "Created things participate in the Divine goodness by way of similitude, inasmuch as they are good. But that which is the greatest good in created things is the goodness which consists in the order of the universe, which is most perfect. ... It pertains to providence to ordain things unto the end. But after the Divine goodness, which is an end separated from created beings, the principal good existing in the being themselves is the perfection of the universe."
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The goodness of the order of the universe, therefore, is the highest end in the finite order of ends, precisely because, in this universal order consists the highest communication of Divine goodness; nevertheless, it is clear, both from the passage just cited and from the one immediately preceding (P.I, q. 103, a. 2.), that the order of the universe (in which the definition of finis-quo ultimus is evidently verified, inasmuch as it is the highest created attainment or representation of the Divine goodness) is not the finis supremus or absolutely last end, but is ordained to the extrinsic end (finis-qui). For Saint Thomas states clearly that the very perfection of the universe, which constitutes its order, is the last intrinsic end existing in creatures themselves and therefore finite, but that it is subordinated to the supreme end, namely the Divine goodness. Hence, whenever Saint Thomas teaches that the created manifestation, communication or imitation of the Divine goodness is the ultimate end, he must be understood, as is clear from his own words, to be speaking of the finis-quo, not of the finis-qui, of the last end in the order of created and finite ends, not of the supreme or absolutely ultimate end. Therefore those who would maintain that the supreme end of creatures, their ultimate finis-qui is not a good extrinsic to the entire universe, but is rather a finite good intrinsic to the created order, are in open variance with the clearly expressed mind of Saint Thomas.
THE FINIS-CUI OF CREATION
We have seen that, according to those who place the finisqui tdtimus of created beings in the finite entity called extrinsic glory, God Himself is only the finis-cui and that, by this term, they mean that God is the subject for whom the created finite perfection of extrinsic glory is intended. By this terminology, moreover, they sincerely wish to vindicate for God the fullest perfection of final cause and of the ultimate end of all things, in accord with the data of revelation and of sound philosophy. But, despite all good intentions, the terminology is in itself defective, because extrinsic glory, as we know both from faith and from reason, can in no wise affect God intrinsically and therefore it is metaphysically impossible that He be in any true sense the last end of all things, precisely and solely, as this terminology contends, because He desires this finite entity for Himself. Moreover, such terminology is entirely foreign to Saint Thomas. It is true that he never uses this technical division of finis, as he does the technical terms finis-cuius and finis-quo, but he never loses sight of the fact of paramount importance, namely, that finis and final cause as applied to God and to creatures are strictly analogical. Hence, he is never misled by experience with created ends into attributing the imperfections of finite ends to the infinite end of all things; consequently, such an application of the term finis-cui as that made by Lessius and so many moderns is clearly excluded in the writings of Saint Thomas: "An effect must tend toward the end in the way in which the agent acts on account of the end. But God, who is the first efficient cause of all things does not so act that by His action He acquires something; for He is solely in perfect ACT, whence He is able to bestow. Creatures, therefore, are not ordered unto God, as unto an end for Whom something is acquired, but, so that from Him they may attain Him, since He is the end." 55 Again, "The last end, on account of which God wishes all things, in no wise depends on those things which are ordained to the end, neither regarding His existence, nor This terminology which makes God the finis-cui because of a finite finis-qui (extrinsic glory) seems impossible, not merely because it logically deprives God of the intrinsic perfection of final causality, but also because, according to Suarez, extrinsic glory does not constitute a true good for God; hence it seems doubly impossible that He be truly and solely the last end (finiscui)) because He intends for Himself a good which not only cannot affect Him intrinsically, but moreover is, in no proper sense, a true good for Him: "For among men those extrinsic denominations (such as extrinsic glory) would be rightly considered not to be a real good, unless they were useful for some intrinsic perfection; because therefore this glory brings no utility to God, it cannot properly be considered His good."
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If, therefore, one wishes to apply the term finis-cui, according to its accepted definition, to God as Creator of all things, then the only possible good on account of which He can be truly called a finis-cui, that is the subject for whom the finis-qui is intended, consists in His own intrinsic goodness, which is His unique finis operantis; this is the unique ultimate finis-qui of all creatures; this, as the summum bonum and objective source ^Contra Gent 1, 93, 6. of His infinite happiness, God possesses by identity; this He loves with an infinite and necessary love, and finally, He wishes this to be the summum bonum of creatures, the source and unique first final cause of all their perfection according to each one's nature. Hence intellectual creatures, who alone in a proper sense act for an end by their own determination instead of merely being directed toward their end, cannot attain to that subjective created perfection to which they are intrinsically ordained, unless they deliberately recognize the essential subordination of themselves and all their intrinsic perfection to the source of their entire being and operation, namely, the Divine goodness, or unless they love this Divine goodness as belonging primarily, absolutely and by identity to one subject alone which is God and merely secondarily, conditionally and by participation to themselves. That the essential order intended by God is this, namely, that He be, in the sense just explained, the finis-cui for whom His infinite goodness should be loved and intended, not only by Himself, but by men, is clear according to Saint Thomas from the fact that rational creatures ought to ordain their will unto God, "not only thus in order that man may enjoy the Divine goodness, for this pertains to that love which is called love of concupiscence, but rather, accordingly as the Divine goodness is in God Himself, which pertains to the love of friendship. For this cannot be from God, that anyone do not will the Divine goodness as it is in God Himself, since, on the contrary, God inclines every will to will what He wills; but God wills the summum bonum as it is in Himself " m We may conclude this article by summarizing briefly Saint Thomas* position. How widely divergent it is from the ordinary exposition in modern manuals, which depend on Lessius, may be seen by aligning their position summarily in parallel columns. This table will make clear what has been developed in the foregoing dissertation, namely, that while Saint Thomas and those who have followed him closely have been careful never to make a finite good an ultimate Divine end, Lessius fails in this item.
s9 De Malo, q. 1, a. 5, corp.
